ENCOD April Newsletter
No. 32, April 2002
The bi-monthly newsletter of ENCOD
(European NGO Council on Drugs and Development)
Secretariat: Lange Nieuwstraat 147, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium
Tel. +32 3 272 5524 / Fax.: + 32 3 226 3476 / E-mail: encod@glo.be
Editorial
In a year from now, government representatives from all over the world
will meet in Vienna to evaluate the commitment they made in 1998, at
the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in New York, to eliminate
or significantly reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs. All
figures, official and non-official, indicate that this commitment has
not had any impact at all. We also know that the approach towards drugs
control applied by the major actors (the United States and Europe) is
becoming increasingly polarised. While the US government continues to
be obsessed by the drugs phenomenon, going so far as to insist it is
a part of an evil conspiracy that threatens America and its freedoms,
Europe has started an irreversible process towards a policy that is
based not on total prohibition, but directed toward finding a careful
balance between punishment, treatment and decriminalisation of drugs
users.
As we draw nearer to the Vienna meeting, it will be interesting to see
how the United States and Europe will avoid a public confrontation on
the drugs issue, a conflict that could have major implications for Transatlantic
relationships. A foretaste of this "clash of cultures" took
place at the recent session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in
March, in the form of a strong attack against the European practice
of 'leniency' regarding cannabis use and possession.
According to an NGO observer present at the meeting, the incident was
based on the latest report of the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB). The report contained strong language about the tolerance trend
and called for broad consideration to ensure the consistent application
of the provisions of the 1961 UN Convention across the globe. At the
meeting in Vienna, several of the usual suspects (Sweden, Arab countries,
US) took up this invitation and expressed their grave concern. Countries
like Venezuela and Morocco pointed out an emerging contradiction between
the trend towards depenalisation of cannabis consumption and the continuing
pressure on Southern countries to eradicate cannabis with repressive
means. The countries 'under attack,' such as Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Belgium and Italy, kept silent, opting to avoid a debate
rather than add fuel to the confrontation.
But when a resolution against the practice of leniency appeared, proposed
by countries such as the Sudan and Libya, with the sponsorhip of the
US and the INCB, it sent a shockwave through several European delegations,
whose policies potentially could come under pressure by this resolution.
Immediate informal crisis meetings were convened on how to counter the
attack and intriguing discussions followed that brought to light the
growing polarisation in drug control policy. Finally, a diplomatic solution
was found among representatives of both attacking and attacked countries,
leading to a final text that did not offend nor satisfy anyone. However,
a new effort may well be undertaken next year. If a similar resolution
appears on the issues of possession and supply (coffeeshops, cultivation
for own use) it will be much more difficult to negotiate a compromise.
A public confrontation between hawks and doves on global drugs policies
may be positive. Finally, the controversy on the UN Conventions on Drugs
will reach the forum where decisions can be taken to modify them. And
as we have seen in Europe, once the dialogue starts, sooner or later
some progress will be made. However, it is a risky endeavour as well.
What occurred in Vienna in March was that the US operated behind the
scenes, leaving the frontal attack on Europe's policy to a group of
developing countries that included some of its arch enemies. If the
Taliban regime had still been in power, they too would have been part
of this. At the moment, it does not seem likely that Europe will be
able to gain much support among countries as Nigeria, China or Indonesia
for its tolerant approach to drugs. Because of historical, cultural
and above all, economic reasons these countries are more eager to stick
to the 'war on drugs' philosophy.
Therefore, instead of taking a defensive attitude that tries to avoid
international condemnation of policies it has applied with remarkable
success, Europe should focus on how to put the essential question on
the table: do we want to continue enforcing a global framework for drugs
policies that leaves no room for manoeuvre to apply national or local
policies which are not based on prohibition? In that case, it could
very well be possible that Australia, Canada, Mexico and other [Latin
American] countries could step into the scene. Then the outcome would
be far less predictable.
Of course, in order to make this happen, international co-operation
between drugs policy reformers is urgently necessary. Apart from proving
that prohibition has failed to deliver its stated objectives, we need
to mobilise political pressure on European government officials to take
a more consistent and therefore more credible attitude in the international
drugs policy debate.
By: Joep Oomen
Analysis
One of the areas where the respective drug policies of Europe and the
United States differ most concerns drug production. Europe’s approach
is essentially directed towards the establishment of socio-economic
alternatives for farmers growing illicit crops, while the United States
continues to insist on repressive measures. In this article, Ricardo
Vargas, a Colombian drug policy expert, analyzes the real impact of
US policies on the phenomenon of illlcit drug production and trafficking
in his country.
A crusade in tatters
According to the official figures of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) that were published last month, coca cultivation in Colombia during
the year 2001 increased by one of the largest increments ever recorded,
from 136.200 to 169.800 hectares. This corresponds to a 24.67% increase
over the previous year, and is particularly significant for several
reasons:
1. December 2000 marks the starting date of Plan Colombia, and
the aerial fumigation of Roundup Ultra (a particularly agressive combination
of pesticides) as its main weapon. Until today, a total area of 132.000
hectares of coca and 4.028 hectares of opium poppy has been fumigated.
Considering such intensity of attempted crop eradication, the reported
25% increase in the area covered with coca can truely be called a horrendous
strategy failure.
2. An increase of these dimensions is not explained by a vertiginous
growth of demand for cocaine from one year to another. The reason is
a different one: the fumigations and the increasing seizures of substances
that are ready for consumption inevitably lead to an exaggerated expansion
of the existent areas under cultivation. In other words, current drug
control policies, in particular the practice of forced erradication,
create the conditions for maintaining stable prices of cocaine paste
or even provoking them to rise. Announcements of more fumigations lead
to farmers growing more coca. As a consequence, the virgin forests,
the rivers and in general the tropical rain forests are affected by
the impact of the irrationality of current policies.
3. But the serious environmental damage caused by the fumigations
and the exaggerated increase of cultivation are not the only problems.
There is something worse: those who carry out these policies do not
recognize this reality and continue to ignore the empirical evidence.
They claim there is a need for expanding the fumigations, because, as
the director of the DEA Asa Hutchinson and his Colombian right hand
general Socha say, they will put an end to illicit cultivations within
three years.
While fumigations affect farmers, including their families, foodstuffs,
houses and water sources, drug traffickers in Colombia are stronger
than ever. With their significant manpower, they know that they are
able to invest in the production of coca and poppy over thousands of
new hectares, taking advantage of the critical situation of the Colombian
rural economy and the legal sector in general.
Today, there are more than 160 organizations involved in drug trafficking
in Colombia, with more than 4000 people linked directly to the business.
They benefit from current politics that do not have any credible and
effective strategy against them. This lack of efficiency is usually
hidden behind ingenuous comments claiming that fumigations “have
prevented the processing of 769 tonnes of cocaine that could have gained
the drug traffickers 19 billion dollars.” What is not said openly,
is that those 19 billion dollars have simply been recovered with more
cultivation and greater processing capacities than ever before.
Current politics do not contain a strategy against drug traffickers
One of the most consistent proofs that demonstrates the absence of policies
against the strongest and most unknown part of the drug chain can be
found in the report of the US State Department that was published recently.
In the case of Colombia, its characteristics are the following:
1. The report does not mention at all the subject of the seizure
of assets, keeping in mind that this is a strategic element of a true
fight against drug trafficking.
2. The report ignores that one important source of money laundering
in Colombia is the purchase of land, and fails to recognise it as an
issue that requires realistic strategies in the field of the fight against
drugs.
3. The report does not mention the type of strategies that are
applied to what is referred to as “well established trafficking
organizations based in Cali, Medellín, Bogotá, and other
cities throughout the country”.
4. Finally, the references to the relationship between drugs
and paramilitarism are simplistic, and consequently, do not pay attention
to the complexity of this situation. They are reduced to comments that
are both generalised and useless. No clear decisions are defined in
this area.
Although the document offers insight into the diversity of areas where
various agencies of the US administration is beginning to intervene,
developing its own strategy, it is clear that this strategy is imposed
upon Colombia in a unilateral way. The approaches developed by Washington
serve basically to justify the encroachment of its institutions.
This fact becomes more significant in the light of the conditions experienced
by some Colombian state entities, taking into account their bad situation
regarding budget, infrastructure and qualified personnel to implement
their functions. In this context, the involvement of the different branches
of the army in the fight against drugs is particularly preoccupying.
Obviously, the participation of the army in this area does not accord
with the previous and consistent design of an integral strategy that
responds to the necessities and expectations of the country in as regards
military security. It does not even respond to the minimum requirements
of security for the life and integrity of many people who are slaughtered
systematically or expelled from the areas where they live and work.
The security of the USA
The designated concept of security responds to the defense of the interests
of the USA more than to a reasonable response and confirmation of the
monopoly on the use of arms by the Colombian state. This also extends
to topics such as borders, prison policies, State of Law, air and sea
space etc., environments in which the drugs issue distorts political
intentions, or ends, or goals?. In short, the specifics of the US cooperation
in drug policies do not accord with the national needs of Colombia but
rather to the approaches and requirements of security as defined in
Washington. That adds another element that increases the problems that
already exist in this country.
At the moment, Colombia is also starting to experience the danger of
this renewed definition of security -- from the fight against drugs
to that against terrorism -- caused by the events of September 11 and
the crisis in the middle-East peace process. Those sectors that have
a vested interest in war are seizing the opportunity to modify the correlation
of forces with the insurgent groups, redirecting Plan Colombia towards
a new emphasis in which guerillas are classified as the incarnation
of terrorism.
The argument is not credible due to the absence of clear concepts such
as the international dimension of terrorism (are the FARC comparable
to Al Qaeda? Are they able to destabilize the region?) and much less
in connection with the recognition of the current social and economic
conflict that should be solved with important reforms. Neither is this
argument a response to the presence and cover-up of rampant impunity,
of an extreme humanitarian crisis and the practice of political exclusion
of several population sectors from participating in the process of finding
solutions to the serious problems of the country.
In light of these complex problems, the role of the United States in
prolonging a repeatedly unsuccessful drug control strategy with a strong
military component is becoming a factor that adds more problems to the
internal conflict instead of creating solutions. Additionally, it is
particularly preoccupying to see that the strategy keeps silent on the
fight against the more and more powerful drug trafficking groups in
Colombia, while being reduced to a useless and dangerous ritual for
the farmers who form the most visible part in the drugs chain. Perhaps
these lacks and inconsistencies are explained partly by the fact that
the strategy is only meant to enrich the US companies that produce the
arsenal, deliver the mercenaries and necessary devices to fumigate.
In this way, a giant fraud is perpetrated on the civil society that
pays taxes and feeds the political class in the United States.
A European response
When contrasted with a broad observation and reflection of the scenario
in Colombia and the Andean region, the claims for numbers of fumigated
hectares of illicit cultivation, destroyed laboratories, confiscated
drugs etc, merely become the data needed to justify a complex and useless
bureaucratic institution financed by the ‘fight against drugs’.
In this scenario, European countries should look for more enlightened
definitions of the situation of the Andean region and of the Colombian
conflict.
To refer to a single topic: if it is generally agreed that Europe is
and will be more successful with a less criminalised treatment of the
drugs issue, it should play the role of trying to obtain more dialogue
in the global drugs debate and criticise interventions that contribute
to activating the time bomb which the Colombian and Andean case could
result in.
By: Ricardo Vargas M., researcher at Acción Andina/TNI
News on ENCOD
Visit of Evo Morales to Brussels
On 23 March, Bolivian coca producers’ main leader Evo Morales Ayma
visited Brussels, invited by a group of 11 NGO’s among others,
ENCOD. Morales was expulsed from the Bolivian parliament in January
this year following violent confrontations between security forces and
coca peasants, but miraculously re-entered the political arena announcing
his candidacy for the presidential elections in June this year. In Brussels,
Morales spoke to an audience of 70 on the failure of eradication policies
that Bolivian coca peasants are facing since 1980, and the need for
partnership between Europe and Latin America to counter the US based
‘war on drugs’. A report on the visit can be found at http://www.collectifs.net/risbal/
. The visit concluded with a new invitation to Morales, to participate
in a hearing in the European Parliament in the end of April.
Conference on European drug policy
In the coming weeks, some meetings will take place on the issue of the
planned Conference in the European Parliament, which ENCOD is involved
in. Its goal would be to convince decision-makers in the European Union
and its Member States to address the need to reform UN Conventions as
a way to remove the current tensions between legislation and practice.
On 3 April, a first informative session will take place in Brussels
with several Members of the European parliament who have shown interest
in forming a cross party group on drugs that would support the initiative.
Two days later, a meeting between several drugs policy reformers from
in- and outside Europe will take place during the Conference of the
Transnational Radical Party in Geneva, where the Conference proposal
will be the main point on the agenda. Finally, on 6 May, a hearing is
planned in the European Parliament where drug experts from several countries
will give an update on the current situation. It is expected that one
of the outcomes of this hearing will be a call for European co-ordination
around the proposal for the reform of the UN Conventions.
European Drug Policy Resource Centre ENCOD is involved in the
planning of a European Drug Policy Resource Centre, which will essentially
consist of a website in different languages, offering an overview of
relevant information on European drug policy. The overall goal is to
facilitate the creation of a breakthrough in the European drug policy
debate by presenting the already existing wide variety of alternative
policies to the global community, and to stimulate the development of
policy change and existing alternatives by creating a forum to strengthen
the drug policy reform movement.
A pilot version of this site is expected to be online in the course
of April. For more information on these and other ENCOD projects,
please contact encod@glo.be
DRUGS and DEVELOPMENT is the bi-monthly newsletter of ENCOD (European
NGO Council on Drugs and Development). Currently, the following organisations
are members of ENCOD: ARSEC - Spain, ASK-Switzerland, BCA - Belgium,
CYAH - Spain, CISS - Italy, GfbV - Austria, Gruppo Abele - Italy, GRUP
IGIA – Spain, GVC - Italy, ILA - Germany, LA - Belgium, MLAL -
Italy, TNI - Netherlands. For more information on ENCOD’s activities,
please contact the secretariat.
Responsibility for the published articles in this newsletter is exclusively
of the authors. The newsletter can also be obtained in Spanish (please
contact the secretariat or visit our website: www.encod.org/)