February 1998

 REPORT OF THE CANADIAN TRADE UNION DELEGATION TO COLOMBIA


Background to Tour:

In response to an escalation of attacks directed against Colombian trade 
unionists, the mission was conceived and coordinated by the Inter-Church 
Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA), a church-based 
organization which has established extensive working relationships of 
solidarity with church, human rights and popular organizations in Colombia 
since 1989.

The purpose of the trip was to investigate abuses of human rights directed 
primarily against the organized labour movement of Colombia but also other 
institutions of civil society, namely human rights, church, women's and 
peasant organizations.

Each participating Canadian organization was responsible for selecting and 
covering the costs of its delegate(s), while ICCHRLA covered additional 
logistical expenses and organized the many details of the tour, including 
developing an agenda, internal travel and translation. 

The delegation was in Colombia from October 1-11, 1997 and consisted of 
the following eight (8) persons:

John Bird, journalist, United Church Observer Bill Fairbairn, South America 
Program Coordinator, ICCHRLA Carl Hetu, Canadian Catholic Organization for 
Development and Peace 
(CCODP) and member of the CSN (Quebec)
Rick Kitchen, Canadian Auto Workers Local 127 (Chatham, Ontario) Ken 
Luckhardt, Staff Representative, CAW Social Justice Fund David Onyalo, 
Staff, Canadian Labour Congress Human Rights Department Don Schmidt, 
Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association (OECTA) Paul Smith, Ontario 
English Catholic Teachers Association (OECTA) 

One obvious limitation of this delegation was the absence of gender balance. 
This should be corrected when future delegations are chosen. 

A map of Colombia is included in this report as Appendix I. 

In Bogota, the entire delegation worked as one unit and met with 
representatives from a variety of labour, human rights and other non-
governmental organizations. Among the most significant meetings was a 
comprehensive briefing provided by the entire executive committee of the 
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT).

For four days, the delegation was divided into two groups with the 
following itinerary:

Department of Santander (Barrancabermeja and region): 
Bird, Hetu, Kitchen and Smith

Department of Antioquia (Medellin and Uraba Region): 
Fairbairn, Luckhardt, Schmidt and Onyalo 


Following their visits to the regions, members of the delegation returned to 
Bogota, where they met with Canadian Embassy and Colombian government 
officials. Upon its return to Canada, the delegation travelled to Ottawa to 
present its findings in a meeting with Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy (See Appendix 2).

While in Ottawa, members of the delegation also met with members of the 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and 
participated in a Rountable with Colombia's Foreign Affairs Minister, Maria 
Emma Mejia, and the Colombian Ambassador to Canada, Alfonso Lopez 
Caballero (now Minister of the Interior) (See Appendix 3). 

Much of the success of the trip can be attributed to excellent briefings and 
translation provided by many Colombian organizations and individuals. 
Special mention should be made of the Latin American Institute for 
Alternative Legal Services (ILSA) and the Coordinacion Colombia Europa 
(CCE). The staff of both organizations went out of their way to provide 
relevant information and logistical support throughout the trip. 

Sister Cyndi Mellon deserves our collective thanks for guiding the 
delegation on a daily basis and for providing such excellent political 
translation to help us better understand the complexities and 
contradictions of Colombian struggles. Sister Laura Mayorga provided 
equally helpful translation during the visit to Medellin and the Uraba region. 

It should be said at the outset that, with the exception of Bill Fairbairn, 
none of the members of the delegation had any particular background or 
expertise on the Colombian situation. For that reason, we are struggling to 
find a way to convey in this report the complex interrelationship between 
the issues specific to the trade union movement and the larger context of 
repression facing the Colombian people as a whole. 

Fortunately, in this regard, we are appending to this report a document 
prepared by the ICCHRLA on Colombia. It is entitled "One Step 
Forward...Three Steps Back: Human Rights in Colombia Under the Samper 
Government" and was released at a press conference in Ottawa upon our 
return to Canada.

We encourage everyone to read the ICCHRLA document to broaden their 
analysis of the urgent situation in Colombia. 



**BREAKING THE SILENCE

To the extent that Canadians know anything about Colombia, they know it to 
be a violent country. An estimated ten Colombians are killed or 
"disappeared" for political reasons every day! To put this in perspective, 
more Colombians have been victimized by political violence each year since 
1988 than the total documented number of Chileans killed during the 
sixteen year Pinochet dictatorship in Chile.

But most of what we know of the Colombian violence is either distorted or 
simply false. With few exceptions, media coverage of Colombian violence is 
attributed uniquely to two sources: the drug trade and/or guerrilla-inspired 
conflict. Both of these factors are indeed a part of the equation, but they 
account for only a small part of the daily carnage that passes for everyday 
life in Colombia. 

Colombian and international human rights monitoring groups have solid 
documentation to prove that at present more than 70 per cent of the 
political violence in Colombia can be directly attributed to the Colombian 
state agencies (military and police) and to their handmaidens, the 
paramilitary units.

The Colombian state has demonstrated little ability or desire to put an end 
to the military-paramilitary violence. The Samper Government, as the 
ICCHRLA report documents, has been proven to lack the strength vis a vis 
the country's armed forces, credibility and legitimacy to bring an end to the 
abuses or create the conditions necessary for a negotiated peace with the 
combattant organizations.

In testimony after testimony given to our delegation by the victims of 
human rights abuses, one disturbing conclusion is inescapable: Colombians 
have absolutely no confidence in seeking justice from any institution of the 
Colombian state. Witnesses and even relatives often refuse to provide 
testimony to the Prosecutor General's Office for fear that they will then 
become the target of the next round of military or paramilitary violence. 
This fear is not unfounded: our delegation was informed of many cases in 
which persons denouncing human rights abuses were themselves 
subsequently murdered.

The Colombian government itself has acknowledged the basic truth that 
there is 97% immunity (non-prosecution) for those responsible for the 
violence generally, and virtually 100% immunity for those responsible for 
political/human rights-related violence. In a word, Colombians have no 
place to hide!

The report will now summarize the situation facing the labour movement 
and working class of Colombia. In doing so, we hope to also explain some of 
the root causes of the violence and repression. 


**THE LABOUR MOVEMENT: A PRIMARY TARGET

When one walks into the office of a trade union in Canada, the walls are 
covered with photos of men and women, brothers and sisters, who built that 
particular organization as part of the larger Canadian labour movement. The 
photographs most commonly picture those leaders in their later years. In 
Colombian union offices, the walls are also filled with photos of union 
leaders. The difference is that most are young faces and most were 
murdered or disappeared at an early age. 

At the risk of dehumanizing the suffering faced by trade union leaders and 
activists, the following chilling facts illustrate the degree of trade union 
repression in Colombia:

Of every 10 trade unionists killed in the world in recent years, 4 
were Colombian.

In the early 1990s, a trade unionist was killed every other day, or 
approximately 180 a year.

In 1996, that number increased to 253 trade unionists killed. An 
additional 16 trade unionists were victims of forced disappearance. 

The CUT, the largest and most progressive of three central labour 
bodies in Colombia, was formed in 1986; by 1997, 2300 of its leaders and 
activists had been assassinated. Only one person has been charged for any of 
these 2300 deaths.

(Source: Brother Luis Garcon, CUT President) 


In 1997, members of the teachers unions were being killed at the highest 
rate of any trade union sector.

Virtually none of these deaths can be attributed to either the drug trade or 
guerilla movements. These brothers and sisters died at the hands of the 
military (which includes police forces in Colombia) or, increasingly, 
paramilitary forces.

Trade unionism in Colombia is clearly not respected as an important 
institution in civil society.

In comparison with South Africa, a case better known by most people, the 
Colombian labour movement suffers to a much greater degree under the 
current regime than the non-racial South African labour movement suffered 
in the worst days of apartheid rule!



**A PROFILE OF THE COLOMBIAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT 

The violence directed against the labour movement has greatly diminished 
the number of unions and members. Yet, while we document that overall 
decline in union density, it is also important to stress that Colombian 
unions--central bodies and affiliates alike--remain one of the most 
important expressions of collective resistance to government policies 
which have increased socio-economic disparities in Colombian society. 

The union density in 1995 was approximately 8 per cent, and many of the 
unions are company unions or very small units that act as small interest 
groups for a very small number of workers. In the private sector, only 4.5 
per cent of the workforce is unionized. Of unionized workers in the public 
sector, 73 per cent are teachers.

In 1992 (for which the most recent consolidated national statistics are 
available), 992 collective bargaining agreements were achieved. There were 
100 strikes, 30 of which were deemed "illegal". For comparison, 356 
"collective pacts" between non-unionized workers and employers were 
reached in the same year.

Unions are affiliated to three central bodies: the CUT (Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores); the CTC(Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia); and the 
CGTD(Confederacion General de Trabajadores Democraticos). The CUT, 
despite the loss of leaders through murders, disappearances, displacements 
and forced exile cited above, represents 58 per cent of the unionized 
members. 

These figures reflect a static moment in the labour movement in the mid-
1990s. What is more important is an explanation of the processes that have 
reduced the ability of Colombian unions to advance the conditions of their 
members and to effect social change in the broader society. 

Our report will attempt to summarize the key reasons that account for the 
declining influence of the labour movement. Some of these reasons are 
uniquely Colombian, i.e., national factors, while some of these reasons bear 
upon the larger neo-liberal model that is being externally imposed upon 
Colombia in the interests of global capital. Obviously there is overlap 
between both sets of forces.



**LOOKING FOR PATTERNS

After meeting with trade unionists (leaders, activists and rank-and-file) 
and NGOs that work with labour, we can point to at least four patterns to 
explain the assault on the labour movement. Those four patterns of assault 
are:

Violent Repression Against Trade Unionists Criminalization of Social 
Protest;
Denial of the Right of Freedom of Association; and, Labour Law Reform 
(1990).

Each of these patterns deserves a brief comment. Our sources include the 
direct testimonies given by individuals and written documentation provided 
by labour lawyers, NGOs that work with the labour movement and 
submissions made by all three central bodies to the ILO at the 85th 
International Labour Conference (1997).


*Violent Repression Against Trade Unionists 

In their joint report to the International Labour Conference, Colombia's 
three central labour organizations described participation in legitimate 
trade union activities as a "life threatening activity". Indeed, as we noted 
earlier in this report, thousands of Colombian sisters and brothers from the 
labour movement have been murdered or forcibly "disappeared" during the 
past decade--most of them at the hands of the country's state security 
forces or their paramilitary allies. These murders are cold, calculated 
efforts to undermine the viability of collective actions by the Colombian 
working class.

The situation of endemic violence has been exacerbated by the fact that 
Colombia has the oldest internal armed conflict in the Americas. According 
to the three labour centrals:

"The intolerance of the parties to the conflict is many times directed 
against the civilian population. Promoting the organization of workers or 
being a union leader are considered by some State officials as subversive 
activities. For their part, members of paramilitary groups consider 
unionists as allies of the insurgents. Guerrillas too have sometimes carried 
out reprisal actions against union members whom they consider to have 
betrayed their political convictions." 

In recent years, most of the politically motivated violence against 
unionists (and other social sectors) has come from a network of 
paramilitary groups. The guiding ideology of the perpetrators views trade 
unions as nothing other than fronts for the guerrilla movements. 
Insinuations of connections between trade unions and the guerrilla serve 
therefore as ideological justification to intimidate workers from joining 
unions or from using their unions as agents of social change. Under the guise 
of "national security", unions and unionists determined to seek collective 
change are viewed as "national security risks", making them "enemies of the 
state".

In November 1994, paramilitary groups held the "First Summit of the 
Colombian Self-Defence Committees". In a document which came out of the 
meeting, the groups affirmed that they "would continue to consider as 
military targets left-wing politicians and union leaders." 

Guillermo Marin, a textile worker and Secretary of Education in his union 
(FUTRAN) and CUT Executive Member, was gunned down in July, 1994 as he 
left the conference site of a meeting to discuss the effects of a new social 
security law. Within a month, two more union leaders in the region 
(Department of Antioquia) were similarly murdered. 

Responsibility for these three deaths was subsequently claimed by a 
paramilitary group known as COLSINGUE (Colombia Without Guerrillas) 
which declared that "they were not going to respect the political and labour 
union fronts that the guerrillas use.". Another paramilitary group known as 
MACOGUE (Death to Communists and Guerrillas) claimed responsibility for 
the murder of over 20 union leaders and activists between July and 
December 1994.

Additional death threats were issued against FUTRAN leaders. Three months 
after Marin's murder, heavily armed thugs barged into the union offices in 
downtown Medellin and proceeded to kill two additional FUTRAN leaders and 
severely injure the Union's Human Rights Director. Despite requests for 
state protection after the July murder, FUTRAN never received any support 
from the Colombian authorities and to date no charges have been laid in this 
series of murders.

On February 4, 1997 Hernando Linero Lopez, member of the SINTRAELECOL 
union, was kidnapped by members of a paramilitary group in the Department 
of Magdalena. The following day, his body was found, showing signs of 
severe torture.

For every death, there are hundreds of death threats. Union leaders must, 
from experience, take these threats seriously. They most commonly have to 
join the hundreds of thousands of Colombians who are displaced, or they 
must seek temporary asylum often outside the country. During the course of 
our 11 days in Colombia, at least three persons we met received death 
threats prior to our departure.

Amongst other examples of paramilitary violence against trade unionists 
that could be cited, we want to concentrate on one particular case re: the 
Coca-Cola plant in Carepa, in the Uraba region of the Department of 
Antioquia. We base our information on testimonies provided by leaders of 
the union involved (SINALTRAINAL, an affiliate of the CUT). 

The persecution of the union began with the firing of an Executive Board 
member, who eventually got his job back. Continued efforts to break the 
union eventually led to the development of a relationship between local 
management and the paramilitary unit in the region. Following the tabling of 
union demands on November 30, 1996 and no response from the employer, 
Brother Isidro Segundo Gil was killed at 9:00 a.m. at the workplace on the 
morning of December 4; he had served as Secretary General of the Carepa 
Local of the National Union of Food Industry Workers (SINALTRAINAL) and 
member of the union negotiating committee. Later the same day, an effort 
was made by the paramilitaries to kidnap another worker but he managed to 
escape. This led to a sacking and burning of the union building on company 
premises. According to union testimonies, the paramilitary openly claimed 
credit for the attack.

On the following Monday, the paramilitary units entered the factory 
threatening union members that they must leave the premises by 6 p.m. and 
the area within three days. Pre-designed letters of resignation from the 
union, which according to the testimony were generated on company 
machines (minus company letterhead), were then given to the unionists. 
Forty-two letters of resignation were signed under duress and most of the 
union leadership were displaced to Bogota.

A sample of the one-sentence resignation letter (with translation) is 
provided as Appendix 4 to the report; we have intentionally removed the 
name of the person from the letter as we promised to do. 

While one witness suggested that local Coca-Cola management may also 
have been intimidated by the paramilitary forces, the overall thrust of the 
testimony clearly identified Coca-Cola franchisees throughout Colombia as 
being virulently anti-union and quick to charge union activists with 
"terrorism" (see the Criminalization of Social Protest section below re: 
charge of "terrorism").

The union represents workers at other food & drink-based multinationals 
(Pepsico and Nestles) and spoke of Coca-Cola as the worst employer to deal 
with in the industry.

Although the Colombian government officials with whom we met denied 
that the state security forces support paramilitary violence, our delegation 
received consistent and reliable testimony to declare beyond a shadow of a 
doubt that the collusion is real and ongoing. 

One of the clearest examples came as we were visiting the region of Uraba. 
Travelling on the road between San Jose de Apartado and the town of 
Apartado, our delegation witnessed heavily armed members of a 
paramilitary group casually walking at a distance of less than 3 minutes 
from the military base located in the Policarpa neighborhood of Apartado. 
When we raised this concern in a meeting with the army commander of the 
region, General Rito Alejo del Rio, he denied any knowledge of paramilitary 
units in the region. He further denied any knowledge of the existence of a 
paramilitary roadblock which had been operating on the same road since 
February 1997 (less than 5 minutes from the army base). According to 
numerous credible reports we received, dozens of peasant farmers have 
been detained at this roadblock only to be assassinated or forcibly 
"disappeared". 


**CRIMINALIZATION OF SOCIAL PROTEST

The second and more institutionalized pattern of assault is referred to by 
Colombian trade unionists and human rights activists as "the 
criminalization of social protest". In general, this refers to a multi-faceted 
process whereby the Colombian criminal code is used to make illegal the 
normal functions of a trade union and its membership. 

There is a disturbing tendency in Colombia for government officials to 
attempt to explain all acts of legitimate social protest as being guerrilla 
inspired. For example, during the national public sector strike, key 
government representatives, including the Ministers of Defence and the 
Interior, the military commanders and even President Samper himself made 
public declarations in the media claiming that the strike was initiated by 
the guerrilla and that the insurgents were carrying out these actions to 
disturb the public order. Irresponsible accusations such as these often are 
the backdrop which allow for the imprisonment (under chargers of 
"terrorism") or murder of union leaders. 

Colombia also has a long history of adopting "decree laws", enacted during 
state of emergency legislation. Colombians have lived under a state of 
emergency--also called a state of seige--for much of the past fifty years. 

Beginning in the late 1980s and throughout the present decade, a series of 
special presidential decrees have seriously penalized trade unions engaged 
in social protest and even normal trade union activities. This includes the 
right to assemble and the right to strike. Through "public order" 
justifications, union activities are commonly labelled acts of "terrorism" 
and judges use their judicial discretion to apply the law. Charges of 
"sabotage" and "defamation" (e.g., trade union speeches) are also common. 

With regard to the specific legal language that leads to unionists being 
charged with "terrorism", Decree No. 180 (1988) reads: 

"Whoever provokes or maintains the population or a sector of the same in a 
state of unrest or terror, by means of acts that place at risk the life, the 
physical integrity or the liberty of persons or the edifices of the 
communication media, transport, processing or transportation of fluids and 
fuel plants, using means capable of creating hardship will face up to 20 
years in prison."

So much for strikes in the telecommunications, transportation or energy 
sectors!

Even more threatening is a special procedure introduced in the early 1990s 
known as the "regional justice" or more commonly "faceless justice" 
system. 

Initially introduced to provide protection for judges, lawyers and witnesses 
testifying in drug-related trials, this system has been turned against the 
labour movement and human rights activist communities. It essentially 
consists of special courts which function on the basis of written 
documentation, where judges and prosecutors remain anonymous and where 
the identify of witnesses remains secret. Evidence introduced does not need 
to be substantiated and may not be challenged. In other words: guilty until 
proven innocent!

Any notion of due process is lost in this system. Arbitrary arrest and long 
detentions are common as the process is very time-consuming. But for the 
interests of the state, the process is effective as approximately 10,000 
defendants were tried by this system in 1995 alone. A high percentage of 
persons forced to endure the regional justice system come from the very 
sectors most commonly engaged in legitimate social protest--unions, 
peasant and indigenous organizations. 

During our tour, we had the opportunity to meet with seventeen USO 
(Petroleum Workers Union) leaders who were arrested in December, 1996 
and who are being held in the state prison in Bogota. They are currently 
charged with terrorism and have been subjected to the secret witness 
process. USO has lost 90 of its union leaders to political violence since 
1988, while another 200 are displaced in various regions of the country. For 
the seventeen facing potential 20 year sentences (or worse), they are also 
the victims of a very public and systematic state-controlled ideological 
campaign that seeks to identify USO leaders with the guerrilla movement. 
The goal is, of course, to create a fear in the general populace of militant, 
independent unionism.

We also met with the relatives of many of these seventeen union 
defendants. 

They are desperate to get their loved ones released and have formed what is 
known as "The Permanent Action for the Freedom of Unionists in Prison". 
The relatives conduct a weekly Thursday rally in the Bogota city square and, 
resources permitting, travel to other cities and regions to mobilize support 
for the detainees. As the wife of one of the USO leaders put it while 
speaking through tears, "(he) is not a terrorist; he is a good father and a 
good husband." Even the lawyer defending the USO 17 has been threatened 
with death for taking on the case. 

An earlier example of this pattern concerns the TELECOM Workers Union 
(SINTELECOM). In the midst of bargaining with the Colombian government in 
1992, their main goal was to oppose and prevent the privatization of the 
telecommunications sector. A strike began in April and the stoppage was 
deemed to be an act of terrorism and 13 union leaders were tried in the 
regional justice system. They were detained arbitrarily for nearly one year 
before the charges were eventually dropped. 

In this process, individuals are stigmatized and often lose their 
employment contracts. Union activity is reduced accordingly. 

In testimony after testimony, the excesses of the faceless justice system 
were described to our delegation. As witnesses do not get identified (except 
by fingerprint), it has been common to pay the witnesses to provide 
testimony under many different names. One example provided by a leader of 
FEDEPETROL (the federation representing unions in the energy sector) was 
that of a paid witness who admitted to the scam; he was promptly killed 
following the admission.

While the Criminal Code is used to intimidate and diminish the labour 
movement on the one hand, the legal system's willingness to provide 
protection for trade unionists (and others from popular sectors) against 
political violence is virtually non-existent. 



**DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 

As trade unionism is inherently a collective assertion of rights and 
demands, the freedom of association is the most fundamental pillar upon 
which trade union activity is built. Our delegation concludes that this most 
basic pillar is denied Colombian workers. 

The ILO has repeatedly condemned successive Colombian governments for 
their denial of this basic right. Yet, as we were repeatedly told by 
Colombian sisters and brothers, commitments to address this reality have 
been full of broken promises over the years and up to the present moment. 

While the Constitution provides for the immediate legal recognition of a 
trade union, the legislation in place requires previous authorization by the 
government before legal recognition is secured. Additionally, as will be 
explained in the next section, employers intentionally keep the workforce 
below certain numbers to prevent unionization. 

Further, despite promises to legally delimit certain public sector work as 
"essential" and thus allow for the rest of the organized public sector to 
engage in strike activity, this has not yet been enacted. 

Protections against unfair dismissals and other forms of employer 
discipline are absent, making the right to organize an impossible burden in 
many sectors.

The right to strike is equally circumscribed in that the Ministry of Labour 
can arbitrarily declare a strike illegal, making the union leadership and 
activists subject to the "criminalization of social protest" outlined above. 
Once a strike is deemed illegal, employers can sue for civil damages result 
from the work stoppage. Employers may also legally terminate the 
employment of any workers involved in a strike that has been declared 
illegal.

Under Colombian law, collective disputes are outside the purview of labour 
courts (which are allowed to deal only with individuals). Instead, any 
collective dispute falls under the administrative prerogative of the 
Ministry of Labour.



**LABOUR LAW REFORMS

As in so many underdeveloped countries, the neo-liberal agenda has been 
imposed on Colombian workers through changes to the labour code. Since 
1990 when these changes were introduced, job and union security has 
become virtually impossible for thousands of former union members. 

The 1990 labour legislation (known as Law 50) essentially destabilized the 
workforce and thus created the conditions for diminishing the size and 
effectiveness of organized labour. The most drastic change was the 
legalization of temporary labour contracts which formalized four- and six-
hour shift hours without benefits (e.g., overtime) and encouraged term 
contracts of under one-year duration.

Prior to the 1990 law, workers with ten years' seniority had considerable 
security rights. Now, that security is virtually non-existent for anyone with 
less than fifteen years. The law also makes it easier for an employer to 
initiate collective dismissals as part of a modernization process. With the 
parallel neo-liberal thrust to privatization in Colombia, no seniority 
benefits (including retirement fees) accrue to workers who suddenly find 
themselves outside the public sector.

One of the best example of how Law 50 weakens the labour movement comes 
from the flower industry on the plains of Bogota. Here over 135,000 
workers, mostly women, are employed by some 450 flower-producing 
companies whose markets are primarily external to Colombia. Although a 
form of temporary labour contracts had been practiced "illegally" prior to 
1990, the effect of Law 50 reforms was to standardize this "flexible" 
system throughout the industry as a means of preventing labour 
organization. 

Sub-contracting by temporary service companies (TSCs) is the monopoly of 
just a few families, but for the workers their "boss" is ambiguous: one 
entity supervises their exploited labour and another one pays them. The 
labour contract system has also encouraged the use of child labour during 
peak periods of production.

A second example comes from interviews with leaders of the auto workers' 
union at the General Motors facility in Bogota. The union had just struck GM 
a few weeks before our arrival and the issue was the job insecurity for over 
70% of the workforce resulting from the 4-6 month contracts introduced 
under the 1990 labour law changes. The union membership sharply declined 
from 1900 workers to only 630 following the implementation of Law 50. 

Our delegation was informed that on the first day of the strike, 115 labour 
contracts were cancelled for the most active union members. Speed-up and 
heavier discipline have been imposed after the strike was called off. 
Although the strike was unsuccessful, it does show that Colombian workers 
in the private sector are prepared to challenge a system that has been 
clearly created to fit the neo-liberal model. In this sector, it is also likely 
to signal GM's move to a more fully developed Japanese production system 
for the plant in the future.

Another feature of Colombian labour law that works against union strength 
is the regulation that workers must gather 25 members to be registered. 
Many employers will intentionally keep the workforce just below the 
minimum number to ensure a union-free shop. On the other hand, many 
enterprises are characterized by multiple unions (independent unions and 
company unions being the most common combination). The law further 
requires that two-thirds of a union membership must be of Colombian 
nationality and precludes non-nationals from holding union office. (This 
latter requirement has been ruled as a violation of the right to association 
by the ILO but the practice has not been eliminated.) 

There is also no guarantee of a secret-ballot in union certification votes 
under Colombian labour law.


IN SUM, THE INSTITUTIONALIZED REPRESSION OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT 
IS READILY ATTRIBUTED TO THE COMBINATION OF "THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
SOCIAL PROTEST", RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF ASSOCIATION AND 
SPECIFIC LABOUR LAW REFORMS (e.g., Law 50 of 1990).

WHAT IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED THOUGH COLOMBIAN "JUSTICE" IS COMMONLY 
DONE THROUGH THE "INJUSTICE" OF NAKED VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT BY THE 
ARMED AGENCIES OF REPRESSION--either the military or the paramilitary 
forces. 



**COLOMBIAN TRADE UNIONISM: A FINAL OVERVIEW 

Throughout our meetings with Colombian trade unionists in all regions 
visited, we witnessed an incredible determination to carry forward the 
struggle against virtually impossible odds. While eleven days certainly 
limited our ability to meet with unionists from all sectors and regions of 
the country, the testimonies provided our delegation with an overview that 
allows us to come back to Canada and make very strong recommendations 
for increased trade union solidarity between Canadian and Colombian 
workers. 

In only one instance were we troubled by anyone involved in the labour 
movement and that instance deserves mention. 

While visiting the northern region of Uraba, members of our delegation met 
with the leadership of the National Agricultural Union, SINTRAINAGRO. The 
union was formed in 1988 after the government revoked the legal status of 
two unions: SINTAGRO and SINTRABANANO. The new union, SINTRAINAGRO, 
represented a fusion of the two.

SINTRAINAGRO members, both leadership and rank-and-file, have been 
deeply affected by the intense level of political violence in Uraba. The 
killings have only escalated in recent years as various forces vie to assert 
their presence and authority in the region. (For more detailed information on 
the armed actors, see the ICCHRLA Report.) 

On a political level, the Patriotic Union (UP) and the Communist Party 
maintained a strong influence in the region during the 1980s and early 
1990s. Recently however, their presence has been replaced both by the new 
political party, EPL, or "Hope, Peace and Freedom"(a party which was formed 
by ex-members of the People's Liberation Army, a Maoist-inspired guerrilla 
movement, the majority of whose members surrendered their weapons to 
the state in 1991), and by the paramilitary groups. Virtually all of the UP 
and Communist Party militants from the region have been murdered or 
forced into exile.

The political infighting which has taken place during these years resulted in 
a situation in which the interests of the mostly agricultural working class 
have clearly not been represented. Tragically, the political battles have 
resulted in the death of hundreds of militants of the UP, the Communist 
Party as well as the EPL. These battles have also profoundly marked the 
SINTRAINAGRO union.

While in the past, SINTRAINAGRO's leadership reflected the various 
political tendencies in the region, today, we were told, the leadership is 
comprised uniquely of militants from the EPL party. 

During our interview with the SINTRAINAGRO leadership, our delegation was 
deeply disturbed both by the tone and content of the discussion. We were 
struck by the fact that the briefing provided by the union leaders 
represented an interpretation which was diametrically opposed to that 
provided to us by all the other NGOs with whom we met in the region. 
Specifically, the leaders expressed little concern over the incursion of 
paramilitary groups into the region (which has resulted in countless 
massacres and tens of thousands of refugees). Furthermore, they never 
acknowledged the abuses committed by the military in the region nor the 
links between the military and paramilitary forces which has been well 
documented by Colombian and international human rights organizations. The 
SINTRAINAGRO leaders whom we met also launched a vociferous and 
slanderous personal attack against the courageous major of Apartado, 
Gloria Cuartas, a woman who is well known as a strong advocate for peace 
and a defender of the rights of the civilian population. Disturbingly, the 
leaders did not make a single reference to the conditions of exploitation 
their membership experience at the hands of the local banana growers. 

Before we left the meeting, we were essentially warned that we would not 
be wise to travel in the region (under the auspices of church-based human 
rights organizations) without the prior approval and direction of the 
SINTRAINAGRO leadership.

Our concerns regarding the SINTRAINAGRO leadership were only heightened 
the following day when we met with the army commander of Uraba, General 
Rito Alejo de Rio. Here, we were struck by the fact that General de Rio's 
briefing of the situation in Uraba coincided exactly with that provided by 
SINTRAINAGRO leaders. Moreover, in referring to that union under its 
present leadership, General de Rio had only words of praise, describing the 
union as "the model of models".

Our reason for raising this in this report is not just for information 
purposes. Rather, the SINTRANAGRO leadership told us that it had recently 
been accepted as an affiliate of the IUF and that this affiliation would 
allow it to give the international labour movement the real story of what is 
happening in Colombia. (Subsequent conversations with others suggest that 
the IUF affiliation is pending and not yet finalized.) 

In any event, we are concerned that a union described by an army general, 
well known for his support of paramilitary death squads in the area, as a 
"model of models" will perhaps begin to play a role in the international 
labour movement circles that will further confuse and disinform the rest of 
the world about Colombian workers' struggles. 

While it is certainly not our role to pass judgement on the international 
affiliation of Colombian trade unions, we strongly believe that this 
situation should be monitored very closely. There are hundreds of former 
members of this union who are now displaced in other regions of the 
country who would undoubtedly have a very different story to tell regarding 
the particular leadership that currently heads SINTRAINAGRO. In our view, 
their testimonies should form part of the final assessment of the role this 
union is now playing in the Uraba region. 



**COLOMBIA AS SEEN BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT 

Colombia's deplorable human rights record has been repeatedly denounced by 
many Colombian and international organizations, including the Human Rights 
Commissions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States 
(OAS).

Given this reality, one would expect--or perhaps hope--that the Canadian 
government would temper its encouragement of Canadian trade or 
investment in Colombia or, more positively, link any future economic 
involvement to human rights improvements, including the promotion of a 
serious peace proposal. Unfortunately, this is not the case. 

While the Canadian government has begun to raise some concerns about 
Colombia's human rights situation both in its bilateral and multilateral 
relations, it has de-linked these concerns from its trade and investment 
promotion. In the words of a Canadian Embassy official, the bottom line 
remains jobs for Canadians!

A February, 1997 position paper on Colombia issued by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) states: 

"Colombia offers excellent credit risk conditions for medium- and long- 
term financing due to stable economic conditions in the country..." 

In the same paragraph, DFAIT makes reference to the fact that the U.S. 
Government has "decertified" Colombia in March 1996 for its non-
compliance with U.S. drug-control objectives and has frozen new lending to 
Colombia by the U.S. Export Import Bank.


To DFAIT, this leads to one conclusion:

"(The Canadian) Export Development Corporation (EDC) views this policy 
measure (by the U.S.) as providing a window of opportunity for new EDC 
lending in support of Canadian export programs in Colombia." 

DFAIT goes on to cite Colombia as EDC's largest market for its Foreign 
Investment Insurance policies with over $300 million in exposure, 
"particularly in the oil and gas and telecom sectors." 

Aside from our general concern that Ottawa is encouraging trade and 
investment with a country that has the worst human rights record in the 
hemisphere, the particular encouragement of further investment in oil and 
gas and telecom is especially troubling. It is precisely in these two sectors 
that the Colombian unions have been the target of state and paramilitary 
repression due to their opposition to the neo-liberal privatization policies.

The neo-liberal model imposed upon the world by global capital is the key to 
understanding Canadian commercial interests in Colombia, or to put it 
differently, the key to understanding the lack of more concerted action on 
the human rights nightmare. Since 1990, the Colombian government's policy 
of "apertura" (opening of the economy) has further whetted the appetite of 
Canadian corporations in the energy and telecommunications sectors. 

Colombian privatization schemes introduced in 1991 have affected the 
nation's ports, railway system, cellular telephone system and domestic 
long-distance service, banking, chemicals, shipbuilding, agro-business, 
fishing and a retail gasoline chain. Two hydroelectric plants and South 
America's largest nickel plant were turned over to private ownership in 
1996 and DFAIT predicted more of all the above-mentioned sectors would be 
further privatized in 1997.

Regrettably, this neo-liberal initiative in Colombia is what seems to drive 
DFAIT policy. Consistent with the current Liberal government policy of de-
linking trade/investment with human rights across the globe, Canadian-
Colombian relations are merely one of the ugliest examples of the 
consequences of this profit-oriented world view. 



*Oil and Gas

Three large Canadian corporations--Canadian Occidental Petroleum Ltd., 
TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. and Interprovincial Pipe Line Ltd--are major 
investors in the Colombian oil and gas sector. The sale of pipeline 
equipment for expansion of oil and gas pipelines and new exploration rights 
have increased in 1997 as Colombia moves towards a goal in average daily 
oil production of 1 million barrels a day by the turn of the century (from the 
1996 level of 600,000 barrels per day.) 

A natural gas expansion program for domestic consumption is already 
underway and Canadian utility corporations see this as an opportunity for 
further sales of equipment and expertise. The goal is to provide natural gas 
options to 2 million subscribers by the year 2000 from the 1997 level of 
600,000 families.

A word of potential caution on this front is the $1/barrel tax on oil 
production that goes directly to finance the Colombian military. Should 
Canadian firms eventually engage in direct production, this would be a new 
form of Canadian complicity with the Colombian war machine that should be 
opposed at all costs.


*Telecommunications

DFAIT speaks of a "tremendous opportunity for investment in this sector" as 
the Colombian government seeks to double its domestic lines of density per 
population. Specifically, opportunities exist in expansion of regular 
telephony, cellular and satellite-based communications, and rural 
telephony. 

Compel, a subsidiary of Bell Canada Inc., holds a greater than 51% market 
share in the cellular telephone system in Eastern Colombia. Northern 
Telecom (Nortel) is currently installing close to half a million phone lines 
in and around Bogota as well as providing data packet switching equipment 
and private branch exchanges to Colombian companies. 

The recent privatization of the television broadcasting sector will 
potentially offer additional investment opportunities for Canadian 
companies. 

In both the oil/ gas and telecommunications sectors, there is no evidence to 
date to show that Canadian trade and investment has directly led to human 
rights abuses. However, we cannot deny the context in which this trade and 
investment is occurring: when the unions and their members in these 
sectors fight these massive privatization schemes on the principle that 
these resources and institutions should remain in the hands of the 
Colombian people, they are predictably murdered, disappeared, displaced or 
confront the "faceless justice" system.

Unionists in Canada and elsewhere also fight privatization for the same 
reasons. The difference in Colombia is that they pay with their lives for 
doing so.


*Military ("Defense") Connections

In this sector, we left Colombia with some very real and immediate 
concerns. 

In addition to the sale of Bombardier Dash 8s for civilian purposes (for 
which there is no concern), the DFAIT document states: 

"The Colombian Air Force and the Colombian National Police are each 
currently employing ten Bell Textron 212 helicopters." (and) 

"...there will be a continual requirement for helicopters on the part of the 
Defense Ministry...(and) the Colombian armed forces will have requirements 
for other fixed-wing aircraft and simulators for training" (and finally)

"attractive financing will be critical as could a Government-to-Government 
structure using the services by the Canadian Commercial Corporation who 
have experience dealing with the Ministry(of Defense)."


The obvious question is: what does the Colombian military do with these 
helicopters? Do they restrict their use to civilian purposes (such as natural 
disaster and medical emergency relief efforts) as was suggested to us by 
Canadian embassy staff in Bogota? Or are they used as part of the 
intimidation and repression mechanisms directed against peasant 
communities, rural workers and indigenous Colombians? 

When we put these questions to the Commercial Attache of the Canadian 
Embassy in Bogota, he admitted that there is no monitoring system in place 
to assure Canadians that these helicopters are not used for military 
purposes. There is also no system in place to assure us that this high-power 
aerospace technology is not refitted for military purposes and use in 
repressive operations (e.g., strafing villages, etc. ) once the equipment 
arrives in Colombia.

Once again, there is no conclusive evidence to date to assert that these 
helicopters sold by Canada to Colombia are being used in repressive 
operations.

However, when Rick Kitchen and Ken Luckhardt (CAW delegates on the tour) 
left the Bogota airport to return to Canada on October 11, they observed two 
212 helicopters sitting on the tarmac fully painted in camouflage colours 
normally reserved for military purposes. 

In view of the gross and systematic nature of abuses committed by 
Colombia's state security forces, we believe that there should be as an 
immediate suspension of all equipment sales to Colombia where the end 
user is the police or armed forces.



**Foreign Complicity in Colombia: An Overview 


While it is beyond the scope of this report, we left Colombia with the 
strong feeling that Colombia, more so than any other South American 
country, is the prize that multinational capital is seeking to fully include in 
its orbit. When ordinary Colombians, be they unionists, peasants, human 
rights workers, try to explain why they are so brutalized, they often 
respond with references to the long history of Colombian resistance to 
foreign domination.

With various degrees of sophistication, their articulation of this scenario 
speaks to the crucial geo-political location of Colombia, situated as it is at 
the top of the continent with port facilities on both the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans. Colombia is probably the most bio-diverse country in the world, 
replete with mineral and other resources that light up the deep pockets of 
foreign capital.

The Uraba region in the Northwest is one of the richest areas and, not 
surprisingly, one of the most conflict-ridden areas in Colombian history. 
Both NGO workers in Medellin and municipal authorities in Apartado we 
interviewed spoke of massive development plans for the region that would 
potentially see large mega-projects in transportation, energy and tourism 
by the year 2020. Even if only a small portion of such a scenario were to be 
realized, it would go a long way towards explaining the current 
military/paramilitary policy of clearing the area of any institutions of civil 
society that threaten to impede or prevent such foreign-controlled 
capitalist development.

It is imperative that we begin to focus more attention on analyzing these 
developments in Colombia, specifically the Canadian connections, if we are 
ever going to be capable of responding with the level of international 
solidarity that is needed by the Colombian people to stop the bloodshed. 



**INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH COLOMBIA: RECOMMENDATIONS 

In this final section of the tour report, we want to broadly outline major 
areas of solidarity work that we believe are important and practical over 
the next months. These areas of work and recommendations are not 
specifically tied to any particular Canadian unions or organizations, 
although some obviously are better suited to certain organizations than 
others.



***TRADE UNION EXCHANGES

For historical reasons related to repression, there is the need for Colombian 
trade unionists to overcome their isolation and to be able to relate their 
experiences to the international trade union community. This has begun to 
happen within the continent, but we recommend that the Canadian Labour 
Congress and its affiliates begin this process by inviting Colombian union 
leaders and activists to Canada for speaking/solidarity tours in the near 
future. These exchanges can also include additional Canadian union 
participation in Colombian trade union activities in the south as the 
political situation permits. 

There are many Colombian unions that would dearly love to meet with their 
Canadian counterparts. The unions in the energy (oil and gas), 
telecommunications, education, food, agricultural, and auto sectors as well 
as the central body (CUT) would be obvious candidates. As well, with regard 
to trade union education on Colombia, Canadian unions should take advantage 
of the Colombian trade unionists currently in exile in Canada. At least two 
such persons are well known to our delegation and they are always ready 
and willing to speak to Canadian trade union functions. 



***TRADE UNION REFUGEE SUPPORT

Every trade union organization we met during the tour, especially the 
leadership of the central body (CUT), emphasized the importance of the 
international trade union community providing refuge for trade unionists 
facing death threats in Colombia. This might entail only short-term 
accommodation or it might entail long-term refugee support until 
conditions significantly improve in Colombia. Whichever may be required, 
and it will vary with the individuals in question, we need to begin to plan 
for such solidarity.

Many unions in Canada have done considerable educational work around the 
issues of immigration and refugee policy. It would be a logical next step to 
set in place a process for providing refugee support for the courageous 
Colombian unionists who need to survive and cannot find a safe haven in 
their own country.

When our delegation met with Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd 
Axworthy, following our trip, this was one policy area that Mr. Axworthy 
expressed some sympathy for in the future. He made reference to a similar 
"fast-track" refugee policy put in place for Central Americans during the 
height of the civil war period in the 1980s. 

Thus far, it has been the Canadian churches that have been in the forefront 
of this kind of refugee initiative. We believe it is time for the Canadian 
unions to join the churches in setting up such a mechanism. We would not 
only be saving lives; we would also greatly benefit from having Colombian 
trade unionists in our midst. 



***RESEARCHING CANADIAN CONNECTIONS IN COLOMBIA 

In order to break the silence on Colombia in a meaningful way, there is the 
need for a research initiative that would document the various and growing 
forms of Canadian trade and investment in Colombia. Establishing such a 
data base would then allow for greater lobbying efforts by Canadian 
organizations on their governments and on Canadian corporations who are 
trying to take advantage of neo-liberal investment opportunities while 
ignoring the fate of the Colombian people. 

This initiative, in our view, would best be accomplished by a collaborative 
effort between Canadian and Colombian NGOs who are in a position to 
exchange documentation and follow up questions of relationships between 
the two countries. Trade union research, education and international labour 
fund departments could, and should, be involved in such a project. There are 
identified Colombian NGOs that would be able to carry out this project at 
their end if sufficient funding were provided from the north. 



***"CLEAN FLOWERS" (FAIR TRADE) CAMPAIGN 

One of the most insidious employment situations we observed in Colombia 
is the plight of the female flower workers (referred to earlier in the 
report) working on contracts for 450 employers on the plains of Bogota. 
These women are not only forced to eke out a bare subsistence while being 
exposed to dangerous chemicals in greenhouse production units; they are 
also targeted by paramilitary forces when they attempt to organize. 

We have discovered that upwards of 60% of fresh flower imports to Canada 
come from Colombia. This is obviously a significant portion of the import 
market and we believe that a fair-trade campaign in flowers--like those 
currently underway re: coffee and other consumer commodities--is long 
overdue in Canada. A "clean flowers" campaign re: Colombian flower exports 
already has been established by European NGOs and labour bodies. 

We recommend that a "clean flowers" campaign be investigated by the 
Canadian Labour Congress and its affiliates (especially those with 
international labour funds), NGOs, church and human rights groups, and that 
this campaign be coordinated with CACTUS, a well-established Colombian 
NGO that does solidarity and organizing work with women flower workers 
just outside of Bogota.



***STRENGTHENING THE WOMEN'S SECTION OF THE CUT 

We met with the Women's Department of the CUT on several occasions 
during our stay in Bogota. The Women's Section has struggled to have their 
collective voice heard within the predominantly male and commonly 
chauvinist Colombian labour movement.

One very practical act of solidarity would be to financially assist the CUT 
Women's Section in recruiting women labour activists from outside Bogota 
to attend their well-designed four week women's training program. To date, 
most of the participants have been restricted to those living in or near 
Bogota because of limited financial resources for travel and 
accommodation. 
We were told that US$200 would cover the cost of a participant in this 
four-week program.

This is a very important initiative insofar as women in the public sector, 
especially in education, are clearly targeted by reactionary and violent 
elements in Colombian society. Their resolve to carry on the struggle for 
collective rights through the labour movement will be greatly enhanced the 
more they are able to participate in women's training programs such as that 
offered by the CUT Women's Department.

Of course, we also encourage exchanges of Canadian and Colombian trade 
union sisters whenever the opportunity arises. The next CUT Women's 
Conference will be held in the Summer of 1998, and we were asked to 
ensure that Canadian trade union sisters participate in this conference. 



***HUMAN RIGHTS WORK: SUPPORTING INDIGENOUS AND AFRO-COLOMBIAN 
COMMUNITIES 

Two distinct Colombian communities that have become caught up in the 
patterns of violence deserve unconditional support from the international 
community. The indigenous Colombian community has been the subject of 
tremendous intimidation, dislocation and death as a result of their refusal 
to surrender traditional lands to satisfy the interests of Colombian and 
foreign capital interests, especially in the mining and energy resource 
sectors.

The U'wa indigenous community, for example, is currently in a struggle with 
Occidental Petroleum and the Colombian state over competing claims to 
their land rights and the sub-soil resources. The U'wa have threatened to 
commit collective suicide if their historic indigenous rights are not 
respected. 

Similarly, the Afro-Colombian minority has historically been a very 
peaceful community residing and working primarily in northwest regions of 
Colombia, in the Departments of Antioquia and Choco. They have been a 
central part of the agricultural workforce in the Uraba region of Antioquia 
for decades. Owing to the violence which has plagued that area in recent 
years (as explained above), the Afro-Colombian community has now become 
part of the statistics of death that passes for everyday life in that region 
of the country.

These two communities would greatly benefit from increased international 
exposure to their struggles. The Canadian labour movement should begin to 
develop working relations with indigenous groups and Afro-Colombian 
organizations in Colombia to advance the specific aspirations of both of 
these uniquely oppressed groups.



***SUPPORT FOR PEACE INITIATIVES

Along with Canadian churches, human rights and NGOs involved with 
Colombia, the Canadian labour movement should make every effort to 
provide political and practical support for legitimate peace initiatives 
undertaken by Colombian and/or international actors. For example, the 
petroleum workers' union USO has pledged to campaign for a national peace 
process that would involve broad sectors of civil society. If this or similar 
initiatives gain momentum, the international trade union community will 
surely be able to play a valuable role in achieving what the majority of 
Colombians most desperately desire, peace and justice.



***SECTORAL SOLIDARITY

At a certain point in the development of international trade union solidarity 
work, it is important to encourage sectoral relationships between Canadian 
and Colombian unions. It is perhaps premature to do anything more than 
mention this possibility at this point in time insofar as our delegation was 
not as representative of the breadth of Canadian labour as it might have 
been and because we do not want to be presumptuous in recommending any 
specific sectoral relationships. 

However, suffice it to say that direct ties already exist through 
international and national trade union centrals between Canada and 
Colombia. For example, the CLC International Affairs Department was 
represented on as an ICFTU delegation that visited Colombia just after our 
delegation returned to Canada. Additionally, there is great scope for 
sectoral relationships to be established between Canadian and Colombian 
unions in education, mining, energy, telecommunications, auto and 
food/beverage, amongst others..

At this point in time we believe that Canadian unions should respond at the 
broadest level of political solidarity with their brothers and sisters in 
Colombia. The sectoral relationships will evolve after we firstly establish 
as an understanding of the horrendous plight facing all Colombian unions and 
workers.

In sum, the Colombian trade union crisis is one which all of Canadian labour 
must understand and respond to with the greatest level of solidarity 
possible. Public and private sector unions alike, unions large and small, 
have a role to play, and we hope that our delegation has laid the foundation 
for the future solidarity that is so urgent! 



In solidarity,


John Bird (United Church journalist)
Bill Fairbairn (ICCHRLA)
Carl Hetu (CCODP, CSN)
Rick Kitchen (CAW)
Ken Luckhardt (CAW)
David Onyalo (CLC)
Don Schmidt (OECTA)
Paul Smith (OECTA)




Appendix I	Map of Colombia

Appendix 2	Correspondence between ICCHRLA and Mr. Lloyd Axworthy,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada

Appendix 3	Canadian Media Coverage of Tour

Appendix 4	Letter of Forced Resignation from SINALTRAINAL



APPENDIX 2

Correspondence between ICCHRLA and
Mr. Lloyd Axworthy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada


APPENDIX 3

Canadian Media Coverage of Tour


APPENDIX 4

Dear Sirs:

By this letter I am submitting my irrevocable resignation as a member of 
the labour organization, SINALTRAINAL. Carepa Local. 

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,







"A Life Threatening Activity" Trade Unionism Under Attack in Colombia 



Report of the Canadian Trade Union Delegation to Colombia 

February, 1998