NACLA's articles on Colombia provide a much needed antidote to the parrot-like "mainstream" media "analysis" about what is going on in Colombia.
______________ The Wars Within: Counterinsurgency in Chiapas & Colombia --------------------- Vol. XXXI, No 5 March/April 1998 INTRODUCTION 1997 saw a dramatic escalation of violence in Chiapas and Colombia. The December 22 massacre of 45 unarmed civilians in Chiapas was only the tip of the iceberg. Five hundred people were the victims of politically motivated killings in Chiapas last year, and thousands of Chiapanecos were forced to flee their homes. In Colombia, meanwhile, 1997 saw 185 politically motivated massacres, in which 1,042 people were killed. Today, over a million Colombians are refugees of the violence. This is textbook low-intensity warfare, with some slight modifications. The aim is to undermine the social bases of insurgent movements by terrorizing civilians in the areas of conflict. The methods include massacres and the razing of entire communities at the same time that government agencies and army units try to win the "hearts and minds" of peasants by offering handouts, subsidies and free haircuts. The novelty in Chiapas and Colombia, as this special NACLA report documents, is that paramilitary groups are increasingly taking a leading role in the counterinsurgency. This is particularly the case in Colombia, where the army has been virtually replaced by paramilitaries. In Mexico, government officials of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) have been directly implicated in the organization and funding of several paramilitary groups operating in the state of Chiapas. This "privatization" of counterinsurgency, as Ricardo Vargas calls it, is directly linked to the need of these countries to maintain a veneer of legitimacy and stability in order to assure continued foreign investment. Organizing paramilitary groups has one crucial advantageplausible deniability. The paramilitarization of the war allows government officials to point fingers at "uncontrollable" paramilitary groups for the escalating violence and express their "horror" at the atrocities committed while assuring international investors that these are "excesses" that will be "investigated" and soon "brought under control." Also new is that in both Colombia and Chiapas, paramilitary groups are not silent or behind-the-scenes actors. They are in fact quite public. Carlos CastaPo, who leads the ruthless United Self-Defense Units of Colombia responsible for dozens of massacres throughout the Colombian countryside in the past several yearsregularly gives interviews to local and foreign journalists (including Robin Kirk in this issue), in which he has repeatedly announced his intention of leading the battle to destroy the FARC. The state government in Chiapas, run by the "dinosaur" wing of the PRI, has openly given financial support to paramilitary groups operating in Chiapas. PRI Deputy to the Chiapas State Congress, Samuel S`nchez S`nchez, is an open advocate, and many say ringleader, of the "Peace and Justice" paramilitary group. Like the counterinsurgency wars in Central America in the 1980s, counterinsurgency in Chiapas and Colombia has its rationalizing myths. The old myths of Soviet- and Cuban-inspired Communism are no longer functional in this post-Cold War world, so new myths have been created. The Colombian government and its allies in Washington are resurrecting the narcoguerrilla theory as witnessed last October when U.S. Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey visited Colombia and praised the soldiers fighting against the "terrible threat to democracy of 15,000 narcoguerrillas." The equally ludricous myth in Chiapas is that the army must be sent in to reestablish order among the "feuding Indians" that are allegedly responsible for the violence. Like in the 1980s, the U.S. media has unquestioningly parroted these rationalizing myths as fact. Counterinsurgency in the 1990s is not about protecting democracy or preventing local-level violence in either Colombia or southern Mexico. It is, rather, about securing particular national and international interests amidst the economic and political transformations wrought by the neoliberal agethe interests of PRI hardliners and their supporters in Chiapas; of the emerging narco- bourgeoisie in Colombia who want to protect their transport routes; of multinationals who want to be able to freely exploit the mineral wealth of Chiapas and the oil fields of Colombia; and last but not least, of the United States and its desire for continued hegemony in the region. ============================================================= TABLE OF CONTENTS ----------------- The Escalation of the War in Chiapas by Luis Herndez Navarro Last December's bloodbath at Acteal was only the most recent episode of political violence in the ongoing conflict in Chiapas. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Who are the Paramilitaries? by Andres Aubry and Angelica Inda ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Lessons of Acteal by Richard Stahler-Sholk The Zapatistas have touched a raw nerve in a political system that once seemed unshakable, prompting an unprecedented militarization of southeastern Mexico. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Peace Talks, But No Peace by Karen Kampwirth Since the emergence of the Zapatistas in 1994, the Mexican government has proven willing to talk but not to truly negotiate with the rebels. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Aftermath of Acteal A photo essay by Janet Schwartz ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The FARC, the War and the Crisis of the State by Ricardo Vargas Meza The recent resurgence of the FARC is the direct result of the deep institutional crisis facing Colombian politics today. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Paramilitarization of the War in Colombia by Marc W. Chernick Paramilitary groups have launched a national strategy to beat back the growing military power of insurgent groups. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ A Meeting with Paramilitary Leader, Carlos Casta*o by Robin Kirk ------------------------------------------------------------------------ One in Every 40 Colombians, a Refugee by Robin Kirk ------------------------------------------------------------------------ U.S. Entanglements in Colombia Continue by Coletta Youngers Reviving the rhetoric of the Reagan/Bush years, U.S. officials are pointing to the "narcoguerrilla" threat-erasing the already blurry line between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Possibilities for Peace by Arturo Alape How to bring about peace is the question that dogs Colombian politics today. Recent local-level initiatives may hold the key to peace. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Party Politics, Reformism and Political Violence in Colombia by Marc W. Chernick Reforming the exclusionary two-party system and negotiating a lasting peace with the multiple armed groups operating in the country are the key tasks facing Colombia's future president. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Oil in a Time of War by Steven Dudley and Mario Murillo As protests over the privatization of oil and the growing power of foreign capital are met with militarization and repression, Colombia's oil industry is becoming another theater of the country's ongoing war. ------------------------------------------------------------------This month's news | CSN Home