=======================================
The deteriorating situation in Colombia
has sparked a growing debate within the
Clinton administration and the Pentagon
over how to deal with the threat.
=======================================


THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, 10 April 1998

Colombian Rebels Seen Winning War
U.S. Study Finds Army Inept, Ill-Equipped 
----------------------------------------- 

By Douglas Farah

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has concluded that Colombia's 
military, battling a Marxist insurgency financed by millions of dollars 
from the cocaine and heroin trade, could be defeated within five 
years unless the Bogota government regains political legitimacy and 
its armed forces are drastically restructured.

The report, one of the bleakest assessments to date of Colombia's 
fragile security situation, asserts that Colombia -- one of the largest 
countries in South America and the one with the oldest tradition of 
democracy -- would turn into a "narco-state" if the insurgents 
continue to grow and the government ceases to function effectively. 

A summary of the report, prepared in November, was obtained 
yesterday by The Washington Post, while two sources with direct 
knowledge of the full text provided details not included in the 
summary. 

The DIA, the principal U.S. military intelligence service, estimates the 
number of Marxist insurgents in Colombia at more than 20,000 -- 
markedly higher than previous, widely held estimates of 15,000 -- 
divided between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), with about 15,000 members, and the National Liberation 
Army (ELN), with about 5,000. While the two groups occasionally 
coordinate tactics, they usually operate independently.

The DIA assessment notes that the guerrillas now have small aircraft 
for surveillance operations and for moving rebel leaders and 
munitions around the country, as well as surface-to-air missiles and 
sophisticated heavy weapons bought with drug money from 
countries of the former Soviet Bloc. 

At the same time, according to the report and senior U.S. officials, the 
Colombian military has proved to be inept, ill-trained and poorly 
equipped. Of the 120,000 armed forces members, only 20,000 are 
equipped and prepared for combat, according to U.S. intelligence 
sources. Standard military doctrine holds that a regular army needs a 
10-to-1 advantage in size to defeat a well-equipped and steadfast 
insurgency. 

The guerrillas have been fighting the government for the past three 
decades but have never before evinced the strength now attributed 
to them. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the rebel groups 
control more than 40 percent of Colombia. Ten years ago, according 
to Colombian intelligence officials, the guerrillas maintained a 
presence in 173 municipalities; now, sources say, they are operating 
in close to 700. 

About two-thirds of FARC units and half of ELN units are involved in 
drug trafficking, according to U.S. and Colombian intelligence sources, 
providing the two groups with tens of millions of dollars to finance 
their operations.

The pessimistic assessment of the situation in Colombia, which 
produces 80 percent of the world's cocaine and a growing share of 
the heroin consumed in the United States, was echoed by Gen. 
Charles Wilhelm, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, which is 
responsible for U.S. security in Latin America.

"The primary vulnerability of the Colombian armed forces is their 
inability to see threats, followed closely by their lack of competence 
in assessing and engaging them," Wilhelm told a congressional 
hearing on March 31.

In an April 6 letter to Gen. Manuel Jose Bonett, commander of the 
Colombian military, Wilhelm said that "at this time the Colombian 
armed forces are not up to the task of confronting and defeating the 
insurgents. . . . Colombia is the most threatened in the area under the 
Southern Command's responsibility, and it is in urgent need of our 
support." 

Bonett, who made the letter public, agreed, saying the Colombian 
armed forces are in "a position of inferiority" to the rebels and 
adding that he would gladly accept U.S. military aid, even "atomic 
bombs." 

The deteriorating situation in Colombia has sparked a growing debate 
within the Clinton administration and the Pentagon over how to deal 
with the threat. Although the United States provided about $ 100 
million to Colombia last year for anti-drug operations, the 
administration has tried to keep Colombia from using the aid directly 
for counterinsurgency purposes.

However, because of guerrilla involvement in drug trafficking, such a 
distinction has become difficult to make. Moreover, there is growing 
pressure in the Congress, led by Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), for the 
administration to provide the Colombian army with Black Hawk 
helicopters and other more sophisticated military aid. 

A senior State Department official said U.S. policy in Colombia "is to 
assist in fighting narcotics production and trafficking. . . . When our 
personnel and equipment are attacked during counter-drug 
operations, they will return fire. We do not, however, provide 
assistance for offensive counter-guerrilla operations."

According to U.S. military sources, there are about 200 U.S. military 
personnel in Colombia. About half are assigned to operate and 
protect two large radar bases that were installed in recent years to 
track flights of planes piloted by suspected drug traffickers. The rest 
are involved in a variety of training missions, the officials said. 

The administration is debating whether to supply Colombia with 
sophisticated communications equipment and intelligence support, 
but the possibility of increased aid has raised concerns among human 
rights groups because of the Colombian military's abysmal human 
rights record in recent years.

"There is no magic line" between counter-drug and counter-
insurgency aid, said Carlos Salinas of the human rights group 
Amnesty International, and the growing congressional pressure on 
the administration to give Colombia more military aid with fewer 
restrictions "could unwittingly fuel human rights violations."

But F. Andy Messing of the Washington-based National Defense 
Council Foundation, which studies guerrilla warfare, warned that 
unless Colombia receives sustained U.S. military and economic aid, 
the insurgents would be unbeatable. "When one side has the 
advantage, there is no stopping them," Messing said. "The guerrillas 
have the big Mo [momentum], so why not go for the whole 
enchilada?"

Copyright 1998 The Washington Post