The U.S. State Department recently announced a two-year, $1.3 billion emergency U.S. aid package for counter-narcotics operations in Colombia. The plan also is geared toward helping President Andres Pastrana negotiate peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But the plan will have the opposite effect. It will end the peace negotiations between the rebels and the government and re-ignite the war. Ultimately, the plan does little more than pave the way for greater U.S. involvement.
U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright was set to arrive in Colombia on Jan. 14, following her recent announcement of a $1.3 billion emergency aid package to Colombia. The package answers President Andres PastranaUs funding request for Plan Colombia, a proposal to fight drug trafficking, stimulate the economy and aid the peace process with Colombian rebels. According to the State Department, over half of the aid will fund drug interdiction efforts in the south and assist in the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
But the aid will not bring peace. Instead, a detailed analysis of the budget proposal suggests that it is only enough to encourage a renewed offensive against the FARC, effectively ending the peace negotiations. The bulk of the money pledged for counter-narcotics efforts will go directly to the military to fight the rebels, who facilitate much of ColombiaUs drug trade. This will tip the balance of power away from the government in Bogota and toward the military, which has always opposed the peace negotiations. Ultimately, the door will open wider for greater U.S. involvement.
For two reasons, it doesnUt appear that the U.S. government wants a peace settlement right now between the FARC and the government. First, if modeled on the current situation, a peace deal could give the rebels permanent control of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), which includes the coca-rich areas of Putamayo and Caqueta in southern Colombia. The region both produces cocaine and is a corridor from Bolivia and Peru to the United States. More than 80 percent of the drug flow into the United States comes from or through Colombia, according to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration estimates.
Clearly, leaving this area in the hands of the FARC would cause considerable obstacles for U.S. counter-narcotics efforts. Although the FARC doesnUt actually traffic itself, it does provide protection services to coca farmers and smugglers. Already, the president has ceded temporary control of the DMZ to the rebels to facilitate the negotiations. The peace process could result in the FARCUs de facto permanent control, even if the area remains technically under the governmentUs jurisdiction. In practice, the FARC has already created local governments and runs the region as a separate state. A peace statement could eliminate any remaining government influence in the area.
Venezuela, a top U.S. oil supplier, gives the United States another reason to want to prevent a peace deal. Allowing the FARC free range in southern and eastern Colombia would leave Venezuela vulnerable. Already, increasing trafficker and possibly rebel activity along the Orinoco river basin has caused concerns. The river is an important drug conduit, a gateway to the island route through the Caribbean. The United States will also train the Colombian military in counter-narcotics river operations.
The bulk of the aid, approximately $341 million, will reinforce the Colombian military. A new anti-narcotics battalion is currently being trained by U.S. Special Forces, with two more to be created. In addition, the United States will provide 63 helicopters. Also, a U.S. forward operations base with an airfield will be built on the Colombia-Ecuador border. This base will support reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, according to Kenneth Bacon, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. This stepped-up military activity will pressure the FARC, forcing it to react.
The Colombian military opposes the peace talks. The war has raged for decades and the military argues that the deal would be tantamount to surrender. Moreover, if the FARC is granted the DMZ permanently, the country will be split, its sovereignty and the militaryUs stature reduced. The prospective division of Colombia has pitted nationalists and the military against peace proponents. Pastrana, positive that the military canUt win, is pushing for a peaceful solution. U.S. intervention, however, will change the situation. Already the United States is involved in intelligence gathering operations. The RC-7B intelligence gathering aircraft that crashed in Colombia in July is just one sign of this. The value of the aircraft, in terms of its costs and its abilities, illustrates the serious commitment the United States is willing to make. Further involvement will only serve to bolster the military, inflaming the conflict.
Although negligible in actual numbers, the increased U.S. presence will have an extremely important strategic impact. The increase in actual U.S. presence in the field and intelligence operations will act as a force multiplier Pdramatically increasing the Colombian militaryUs effectiveness through greater U.S. involvement and more intelligence. Also, having more U.S. personnel and assets in the field opens the door for greater U.S. involvement in the future.
However, the funding and increased military effectiveness will still not be enough to win this war. The rebels have been fighting since the mid-1960s. Its Marxist-Lenin ideology is incompatible with the Colombian government, making it unlikely to settle for less than an independent territory. The rebelsU control of San Vicente del Caguan is a good example. The FARC rules the town and is entrenched there; it is difficult to imagine the guerrillas giving it up. The guerrillas receive ample funding through its association with the drug trade. Also, the rebels can survive indefinitely in the jungle terrain of the DMZ. Since the creation of the DMZ, the guerrillas have attacked military targets throughout the country. In addition, the rebels' concerns have not been addressed and renewed fighting will certainly not provide incentives for peace.
The U.S. aid is likely only to worsen the conflict and ultimately lead to greater U.S. involvement. Neither the Colombian military nor the guerrillas will be any closer to victory. More importantly, the renewed fighting will destroy the current peace negotiations and lessen the likelihood of future talks. In two years, the money will be gone, the fighting will intensify, the United States will have increased its commitment both in money and assets in the field and the peace talks will be long forgotten. At that point, the United States will be forced to send more money or more troops P or both.