By Gonzalo Hernández, EL ESPECTADOR, November 25, 2024
(Translated by Eunice Gibson, CSN Volunteer Translator)
President Petro, in his campaign, had already manifested his interest in renegotiating the free trade agreement (TLC in Spanish) with the United States. The justification is in the asymmetry of the negotiation and in the negative effects of the treaty on some agricultural subsectors in this country, especially when they are competing with the heavy subsidy policies in the United States.
Nevertheless, his recent call for revision of the treaty—along with the participation of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (CIADI in Spanish), cannot be understood without considering the North American election that took place just three weeks ago. Now is not the time to make a call on the United States to renegotiate as one of our first diplomatic messages on the eve of the second Trump administration.
First, because it’s practically impossible that the United States Congress would open the door to a renegotiation. Even if it were to give the Executive that authority, it would now be naïve to expect better terms for Colombia than those obtained in the TLC signed in 2006 and that took effect in 2012.
Second, there’s no way it would be advisable for Colombia to approach this unilaterally with a complaint and a possible renunciation of the TLC, and thus risk commercial and investment interchanges along with other aspects, because investors prefer to settle disputes in international tribunals.
Third, we can’t forget that the relationship between Colombia and the United States is on a bipartisan level, which goes beyond disputes between Democrats and Republicans. Right now, it’s more complicated; the agenda isn’t just focused on the war on drugs, as it’s been for 30 years. There are new geopolitical priorities in the United States with the version 2.0 of the Cold War; the ideological platforms of both parties are less homogeneous; and the Trump administration will take on the migration issue with greater pressure, both within and without the borders of the United States. The trade war with China has been announced; and Venezuela presents a challenge to democratic stability all over Latin America. On this last, it could be said, the confusing declarations of Colombia’s administration about “the error” of the elections in the neighboring country were a surprise.
With this landscape, Colombia has to strengthen, not scatter, its diplomacy in the field of economics. Instead of renegotiating the treaty, it would be better to think about expansion of “nearshoring”, so that Colombia could participate in supply chains that reach the United States market with products that right now are being imported from China, but that could certainly confront high tariffs in the midst of the trade war. Besides that, we have to take advantage of the North American industrial policy initiated by the Biden administration, finding connections with the hoped-for industrial and export policy in Colombia which right now is in the stage of advertising and not in the stage of execution.
These points don’t interfere with the strengthening of other alliances (Latin America, Asia Pacific) to diversify our international trade, or those that deal with the fragilities of the government’s legal defenses, which seem to have motivated the President’s statements about the CAIDI.
The treaty took a long time to get underway. The Trump administration won’t renegotiate, and we have to avoid the risk of tariffs that would block even the possibility of “nearshoring”. Better caution than audacity in this matter.