By Sergio Gómez Maseri, EL TIEMPO, September 5, 2025
(Translated by Eunice Gibson, CSN Volunteer Translator)
In the next few days, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, will have to decide if he will certify Colombia’s efforts in the war on drug trafficking. The decision will be known In complete secrecy before September 15, as stipulated in U.S. law.
Apart from a sector of the Colombian government, which continues to insist that the country has complied with its commitments and deserves to be certified, in Washington, the reading on this decision is “a chronicle of a death foretold”.
Not just because of the poor results registered in the area of eradication last year (less than 10,000 hectares eliminated) and the increase in illegal crops in the country, that reached a historical figure (more than 264,000 hectares according to the UN) but also because of accusations that have been coming from the incoming administration.
“I think it’s very hard to conclude that this will end in anything different from decertification. On the one hand, for a lack of results in the war on drugs, something that’s evident, and because there’s nobody arguing for a more favorable decision, at least in the administration. There’s no harmony between the two administrations, and there’s very little opportunity for Colombia to obtain a measure of hope. It would be a miracle if the country ended up being certified,” Juan Cruz told this paper. He was in charge of this region in the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, and now is part of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CSIS).
In that context, this country is facing three possible scenarios: a full certification, a partial decertification (with a waiver or a degree of exception), or a total decertification, with the last two being the most likely under the circumstances.
What exactly is the United States certification against drugs, and how does it work?
The United States anti-drug certification originated in the Foreign Assistance Act pf 1961, amended by the Foreign Relations Act (FRAA) in 2003. These statutes require the White House to publish every year a list of the countries considered “the greatest producers or transporters of drugs”.
At first, being on that list didn’t require automatic sanctions. However, if a country is considered to be “not demonstrably cooperating” with international commitments, that could lead to being decertified.
The decertification decision activates a series of sanctions, including freezing the financial assistance furnished annually by the United States, the instruction to vote against its credits in the multilateral bank, among other measures.
Nevertheless, Washington preserves an escape valve: the waiver, or exception measure that allows it to maintain the assistance if it believes that suspending it would affect its national security interests. Something like that, for example, happened to Bolivia, Myanmar, and Venezuela in September of last year when Joe Biden used this concept to maintain cooperation in spite of believing that they had not accomplished their commitments.
But Trump, from his profile, might opt for a harder line on this occasion.
1. Total decertification: the most probable scenario for Colombia
If the Republican President decides to take the road of total decertification, Colombia would face this situation for the first time since 1997, during the administration of Ernesto Samper, a scenario that would have a high political and economic cost, as it would send a signal that Washington no longer considers this country a reliable ally in the war on drugs.
The difference between now and previous years is evident. In 2018, during Trump’s first term, Colombia came close to suffering the same fate, but it still counted on its allies in Washington who defended its strategic role. Now, on the contrary, this country has lost the better part of its bipartisan support and there are no figures in the Republican administration that could argue on our behalf.
The impact of decertification would be no small thing. The United States legislation contemplates an ample menu of sanctions that go from freezing financial aid, blocking credit in multilateral agencies like BID, the World Bank, or IMF and even commercial sanctions and tariffs.
In the most severe cases, sales of military equipment are also restricted, as well as cooperation in intelligence and participation in preferential commercial agreements like the TLC.
In other words, Colombia would not just be marked on a blacklist along with countries like Venezuela, Myanmar, or Afghanistan, but it would also lose access to strategic resources in the areas of security, commerce, or international financing.
Add to that a Congress controlled by the Republicans who are hostile to Petro and on its own has already proposed cutting aid to Colombia by 50% for the current fiscal year.
In addition, the current situation is much more complex than in the past. To the deterioration of security in the rural areas and the historic increase in coca crops, we have to add the lack of personal and political affinity between Trump and Petro.
In fact, very recently, the two countries were close to breaking off relations, and the friction between the two administrations is permanent. The Republican leader, by the way, has made clear his preference for the use of sanctions and imposition of tariffs as his strategy to obtain concessions and advances in his political objectives.
That’s why a lot of people see this scenario as one of the most likely.
Partial decertification with a waiver: the intermediate alternative
The second option would be a formal decertification accompanied by a waiver. In this case, the United States would send a message of political sanction, but it would maintain cooperation in specific areas—like the National Police, the Army, and civil society—recognizing the strategic importance of Colombia in the region.
In fact, this has been the road used most often in the past when it’s been as much with historic allies as with rivals. It was even the formula used by President Bill Clinton when he decertified Colombia in 1997. After Samper left office a year later and Andrés Pastrana become President, Clinton recertified Colombia and relations returned to their natural course.
It’s a scenario very similar to the current one, as Petro will leave the President’s Palace in the coming year and the United States might be interested in maintaining a certain level of cooperation and have influence while the change in Presidents is taking place.
For former United States Ambassador to Colombia Kevin Whitaker, this would be the best of a bad situation.
“If the Trump administration decides to decertify Colombia, it would be important to quickly establish exemptions to protect critical programs of cooperation with security forces. The United States has every right to be disappointed in the Petro administration’s efforts in the area of eradication, as well as to be perplexed by Petro’s apparent rejection of the idea of ‘shared responsibility’ that has sustained our modern relationship in fighting drug trafficking. Also, the United States probably feels bewildered by President Petro’s readiness to accommodate Maduro’s illegitimate regime. Even so, the Colombian security forces are continuing to confront the drug traffickers and deserve the unshakeable support of the United States,” said the former Ambassador, one of the former officials who best understands the bilateral relationship between the two countries.
A similar thought comes from Michael Shifter, former President of Interamerican Dialog, and now a professor at George Washington University.
“I think it’s difficult to imagine that Colombia will be certified, although perhaps it’s more probable that it will be certified with a waiver, because that would send a message but allow maintenance of part of the assistance which, after all, supports the best interests of the United States. That would also recognize that in less than a year there will be a new administration, which represents an opportunity to redefine the relationship. As demonstrated by the crisis on January 26, Colombia’s political and economic elites can still go to their contacts in Washington, which could be useful in avoiding drastic sanctions,” he says.
According to Shifter, the recent visit to Colombia by Senate Republican Bernie Moreno could have a beneficial result, given his closeness to Trump, and could avoid the worst outcome for the country.
Nevertheless, even with a waiver, the damage to Colombia’s reputation would be enormous. Colombia would be a member of that same blacklist of countries considered not very cooperative, with the risk of losing diplomatic influence and international credibility.
3. Full certification: an improbable scenario
Even though the Petro administration insists that this country has carried out its commitments, full certification is the least probable scenario. Although the authorities have asked Washington to focus on other metrics like interdiction of drugs and voluntary crop substitution, the eradication statistics and the record increase in coca crops make it difficult to defend the Petro administration’s commitment. At least from the perspective of that administration.
In any case, almost nobody in Washington credits that possibility except some minority sectors who argue that the strategy of voluntary substitution and seizures of drugs ought to weigh more than the immediate results in hectares eradicated and the inconvenience of limiting cooperation in the face of a problem that affects everybody.
Nobody knows for sure what Trump will decide; he tends to be unpredictable. But the question doesn’t seem to be whether a hit is coming, but rather how hard it will hit.